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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
_MAl-HICE CHARLE8 GHARVOZ, 
Ad1ninistrator of the Estate of 
:MAURICE BRUCE CiiARVOZ, 
Deceased, 
Plaint~!! and Appellant, 
vs. 
\YEXDELL L. COTTRELL~ 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
9334 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a jury verdict in favor of the 
defendant, Wen dell L. Cottrell, and against the plaintiff, 
and from the Court's subsequent order denying the 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial. In view of the fact 
that the plaintiff has failed to include several facts the 
defendant deems important to his case, we make our own 
statement of facts. 
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Plaintiff brought a wrongful death action for the 
death of 11:aurice Bruce Charvoz, age 25, arising out of 
an accident that occurred on October 26, 1959, at about 
7:00p.m. at the intersection of 17th South and 19th East 
Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah. It was dark at the time 
of the accident (R. 83, 123). 
17th South is a blacktop highway running East and 
West. 19th East is a blacktop highway running north 
and south. The intersection is guarded by stop signs 
facing traffic approaching from the north and south 
on 19th East (R. 64). 17th South Street is curbed and 
guttered on both sides. 19th East is curbed and guttered 
on both sides south of the intersection but only on the 
west side north of 17th South (R. 126, 127), and silt and 
gravel were washed frmn this area, not curbed, into the 
intersection, and on portions to the west of it, by storms 
( R. 125, Exh. D-2, D-3). 
There were painted crosswalks on all sides of the 
intersection (R. 65). At the time of the accident the 
decedent was crossing the intersection frmn north to 
south within the· painted crosswalk on the west side of 
the intersection (Exh. A). There was a street light on 
the southwest corner of the intersection hanging from a 
utility pole but the intersection was dimly lit (R. 85, 86). 
17th South on the west side of the intersection was nlea-
sured by the investigating officer to be 37'2" wide from 
curb to curb with a line dividing the highway 20'8" from 
the north curb and 16'6" from the south curb (R. 70, 71). 
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There wa8 a car stopped on the north side of the 
intersection at the stop sign facing directly south (R. 86) 
with its lights on occupied by witnesses, Ford D. Crandall 
and his wife (R. 83). On the northeast corner of the 
intersection was a ten-acre vacant field (R. 125, 131, 
Exh. D-2). 
The weather was clear, the roads dry (Exh. A). 
The decedent was walking across the west pedestrian 
lane frmn north to south with his head down (R. 88, 128) 
at the time of the accident. He was dressed in dark 
clothing (R. 88, 127, 147). 
~Ir. Cottrell was driving east on 17th South in the 
south lane of traffic at a speed of 30-35 miles per hour 
(R. 69, 141, 142) with his lights on low beam (R. 146). 
He had just come from the Secretary of State's office 
where he had been in a business meeting (R. 133). When 
he ·was about 60-65 feet from Bruce, l\.fr. Cottrell saw 
hin1 and in1mediately applied his brakes (R. 124, 136) 
and apparently pulled to the right causing his car to 
veer to the right (R. 129). He did not have time to sound 
his horn (R. 130, 131). When Mr. Cottrell first saw 
Bruce, Bruce was about to the line dividing the high-
·way (R. 127). He thereafter took two steps, colliding 
with the left bumper and headlight rim of the defendant's 
car (Exh. D-6, D-7). The decedent was thrown up on 
the fender and carried to about the center of the inter-
section where he rolled off. Defendant's car traveled 
over to the west line of the crosswalk on the east side 
of the intersection (Exh. D-6). The probable point of 
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impact between the defendant's car and Bruce was mea-
sured by the officer to he about 6'3" south of the center 
dividing line of the highway. 
The defendant's vehicle left the following skid marks 
as 1neasured by Officer Diaz : 
Before I1npact 
R.F. 12'8" 
L.F. 14'2" 
L.R. 9'8" 
R.R. 20'±" 
Total 
69' 3" 
70' 9" 
66' 4" 
76'11" 
The two right wheels skidded through gravel and 
silt and the left wheels skidded on some silt (R. 127, Exh. 
D-2, D-3). About two days after the accident occurred 
the investigating officer n1ade one skid test \Yhere the 
highway was free from silt or gravel. On the basis of 
the coefficiency of friction determined on this test, but 
using defendant's skid marks through the gravel and 
silt, he came up with a speed of ±2 miles per hour for 
defendant's car. However, as plaintiff has stated in his 
brief, the question of speed is not an issue. 
Before the investigating officer arrived at the scene 
of the accident, Bruce Charvoz was taken to the Salt 
Lake County Hospital. 'Vhile there, on the night of the 
accident, he had a conversation with his mother and one 
of the police officers in which he stated to his mother 
that he didn't see the defendant's car (R. 116, 117). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
·THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IN REGARDS TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF LAS'T CLEAR CHANCE. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 2 TO THE EFFECT THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Plaintiff complains of the court's failure to give his 
requested instruction No. 2· which reads as follows: 
''You are instructed that the evidence estab-
lishes, as a matter of law that the defendant was 
negligent and that his negligence proximately con-
tributed to the death of the decedent, therefore, 
you should find the issues of liability against the 
defendant and in favor of the plaintiff unless 
you should also find that the decedent was con-
tributorily negligent and that such negligence on 
the part of the decedent proximately contributed 
to his death." 
This instruction contains two basic premises : One 
that defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of 
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law and, two, that said negligence was a proximate cause 
of the accident and decedent's resulting death. 
Plaintiff contends that the evidence was undisputed 
that defendant \vas guilty of negligence as a maUer of 
law in two respects: (a) That defendant failed to keep 
a proper lookout and (b) ·The defendant failed to yield 
the right of way to the decedent. 
Plaintiff's claim of negligence upon the part of the 
defendant in failing to keep a proper lookout is based 
upon two theories: (1) That defendant did not see the 
decedent until he was 60-65 feet from him, and (2) That 
under Sec. 41-6-134 Sub. (b) U.C.A., 1953, one is required 
to have lights which will on low beam reveal persons 
and vehicles at a distance of at least 100 feet ahead and 
that therefore defendant is negligent if he didn't see 
decerlP-nt at a distance of 100 feet. 
The undisputed testimony in this case is that the 
decedent was dressed in dark clothing and that he was 
walking across a blacktop street with a dark backdrop 
on the northeast corner (R. 125, 131, Exh. D-2). It is 
common knowledge that dark clothing against the back-
ground of the dark blacktop street and of the dark north-
east corner of the intersection would make it very diffi-
cult for the defendant to observe· the decedent as he 
crossed the highway, and particularly so until he came 
into the proximity of the· direct center of the beam of 
defendant's headlights. For example, in the photograph 
Exhibit D-2 on file in this case, the clothing of the officer 
clearly shows this principle. The officer's black boots 
blend in with the blacktop of the highway so that ,~t is 
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hard even in the pieture to discern where the blacktop 
ends and his boots begin. The same is true of the offi-
cer's dark coat with respect to the dark background on 
tlw northeast corner of the intersection. However, the 
officer's white hat and his light trousers are n1ore easily 
discernible. 
The fact that there was a car stopped at the inter-
section which the defendant observed and had a duty to 
watch was also a distracting influence which would 
require defendant's attention and take part of his con-
centration at the intersection. 
Whether under all of the circumstances surround-
ing this accident the defendant was guilty of negligence 
in failing to see the decedent before he did was certainly 
a jury question and defendant could not be held guilty 
of negligence as a matter of law in £.ailing to observe 
him before he actually did. See 2A Blashfield Cycl. of 
.Atttomobile Law & Practice, Sec. 1256 at page 155 in 
which the rule is stated: 
" ... that a motorist equipped with statutory 
headlights does not observe a pedestrian in dark 
clothing walking in the road ahead of him until 
the moment before striking him is not necessarily 
conclusive of the negligence of the motorist; the 
question of his negligence under the particular 
circumstances usually being one of fact." 
Thus in the case of Falnes vs. Kaplan, Fla. 101 So. 
(2) 377 where a motorist was traveling at a moderate 
speed and did not discover a pedestrian clothed in a 
dark blue uniform and walking on the black asphalt 
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surface of a roadway at midnight until he was but 10 
feet from him, the Court held the motorist could not be 
liable, eve:r; under the last clear chance doctrine. 
The defendant saw the lights of the vehicle of the 
"\\ritness Crandall before he saw the decedent and he 
testified that he was looking directly ahead along the 
roadway. This evidence indicates that he was keeping 
a proper lookout. 
Defendant does not argue with the principle of law 
set forth in the case of Frarnk v. McCarthy, Utah 1948, 
188 P. (2) 737 cited by the plaintiff but does claim that 
the factual situation existing in plaintiff's case is sub-
stantially different than that which existed in the Frank 
case and that reasonable minds would be warranted in 
reaching the conclusion that Mr . .Cottrell was not negli-
gent in the operation of his vehicle. 
Sec. 41-6-78 UCA 1953, provides that the driver of 
a vehicle shall yield the right of \vay, slowing down or 
stopping if need be to so yield, to a pedestrian crossing 
the roadway within a crosswalk when the pedestrian is 
upon the half of the roadway upon which the vehicle 
is traveling, or when the pedestrian is approaching so 
closely fron1 the opposite half of the roadway, as to be in 
danger, but no pedestrian shall suddenly leave a curb 
or other place of safety and walk or run into the path 
of a vehicle which is so close that it is impossible for 
the driver to yield. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury on this 
provision of the statute and the respective duties of the 
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pedestrian and driver. 
:Mr. Cottrell testified that when he first saw the 
<lPeP<lent, the decedent was then approaching the center 
line. At that time he immediately applied his brakes and 
attempted to stop but he was so close that it was impos-
silde for hin1 to do so. If Bruce had been keeping a 
proper lookout, he would have seen the nearness of the 
defendant's automobile, stopped short of the center line, 
or the path of defendant's vehicle, and no accident would 
have occurred. After the defendant saw him, Bruce 
moved some six feet or more into the path of the defend-
ant's car leaving his place of safety north of the center 
line. 
In the case of Coombs v. Perry, 2 Utah (2d) 381, 
275 Pac. (2d) 680, the Court had before it a case very 
similar to our case. In that case the plaintiff was walk-
ing from east to west across Washington Boulevard in 
Ogden, Utah, within a marked crosswalk, at night, be-
tween 26th and 27th Streets when she was struck by a 
motorist driving south on Washington Boulevard. The 
plaintiff had crossed to the center of Washington Boule-
vard and stopped to look to the north for cars from that 
direction. Seeing none, she proceeded west into the 
southbound lanes of traffic a few steps when she was 
struck. The defendant testified that he did not see plain-
tiff at all, his first warning of the accident being the 
sound of the impact of defendant's car against plaintiff. 
The court in this case, Justice Crockett speaking, 
stated at Page 390 : 
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"Consistent with his duty of refusing to take 
questions of fact from juries except in cases free 
frmn doubt, the trial court properly submitted the 
questions as to defendant's negligence, plaintiff's 
contributory negligence, and proximate cause to 
the jury." 
In discussing the right of way rule, the Court stated: 
"The right of way rule simply means this; 
that if two persons are so proceeding that if they 
continued their course there W'ould be danger of 
collision, the disfavored one must give way and 
the favored one may assume that this will be done. 
It is, of course, recognized that the right of way 
rule would not apply, iJf when the faV'ored one 
approached the crosstng potnt, the disfavored one 
was so close that in due care he could not or 
should not reasonably be expected to give way." 
(Emphasis ours). 
This is the situation that existed at the time Bruce 
Charvoz started into the eastbound lane of traffic on 
17th South Street. At the time Mr. Cottrell first saw 
Bruce 60-65 feet away, Bruce was on the north side of 
the center line of the highway and Mr. Cottrell was then 
so close to the point of crossing that he was unable to 
stop. In fact, if he had not applied his brakes, it is quite 
likely that the accident may have been averted because 
the impact involved only the left front bumper and left 
headlight of the Cottrell car, and this after Mr. Cottrell 
had slowed his vehicle after the application of brakes. 
It seems clear that the vehicle was an immediate hazard 
to the pedestrian at the time Bruce crossed the center 
line and perhaps for a few steps to the north thereof. 
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Under the facts of the case now before this court 
and this court's decision in the Coombs v. Perry and 
other Utah decisions, it appears clear that the question 
of the defendant's negligence, as well as the plaintiff's 
negligence, with regard to lookout and right of way was 
by the trial judge properly submitted to the jury. 
Where the trial judge has passed upon a 
question and the jury, presumably fair and im-
partial, has made a finding, while such is not con-
trolling, it is at least entitled to some considera-
tion and should not be wholly ignored on appeal 
in determining whether reasonable minds might 
so conclude. In determining on appeal whether 
the questions of negligence and -contributory negli-
gence were pro1perly submitted to the jury, the 
reviewing court must review the evidence, to-
gether with every inference fairly arisring there-
from, in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
p.arty and must consider any lack or failure of 
any evidence in the same light. (Coombs v. Perry, 
~nfra.) 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
IN REFUSING TO GIVE TO THE JURY PLAINTIFF'S RE-
QUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 13 IN REGARDS TO THE 
DOCTRINE OF LAS'T CLEAR CHANCE. 
The plaintiff's requested instruction No. 13 was an 
attempt to have the court apply the last clear chance 
doctrine to the case. The theory was that the plaintiff 
was in a position of danger from which he was unable 
to free himself, that the defendant either discovered or 
by exercise of due care should have discovered his peril 
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and at that time had a clear opportunity to avoid the 
accident but failed to avail himself of such opportunity. 
Under the facts as presented in this case, the court prop-
erly refused the requested instruction. 
The undisputed testimony is that the decedent in 
this case took several steps from a position north of 
the center line ·of the highway to the point of impact 
without looking to the right to ascertain whether any 
cars were approaching; that he was dressed in dark 
clothing and that the defendant did not see him until he 
was within 60-65 feet of the decedent who at that time 
was north of the center line of the highway. Defendant 
at that time was traveling about 30 miles per hour. As 
soon as defendant saw decedent come into the cone of 
light projecting from his automobile he instinctively 
applied his brakes but struck defendant with his left 
front headlamp. 
In the case of Graham v. Johnson, 109 Utah 346, 
166 Pac. (2d) 230, cited by plaintiff in his brief, Justice 
Wade in his concurring opinion at page 364 in analyzing 
one version of the facts, stated: ''I do not believe that 
the jury could reasonably find that Gary moved at most 
more than three or four running steps after the warning 
was shouted to him before he collided with the car. Com-
ing unexpectedly as this warning shout did, it would 
take some time after Gary started running before Dar-
lene could discern that he was moving toward the path 
of her car and apprise her that he was in danger, and 
it would take further time thereafter for her to start to 
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try to sound her horn or apply her brakes. Whatev·er 
acUon. she took drurhzg that tifme would b·e the rest~;lt of 
reflex action r.ather than deliberation and cl(!)ar thinking. 
U 1Uler such circttmstances, the last clear chanoe doctrine 
has no aJJprication. That doctrine cont·emplates th(J)t after 
one party has placed himself in a periJlous position there 
is a clear cha;noe on the part of the other party to avoid 
the accident." (Emphasis added.) 
So in the present case, Mr. Cottrell, after he dis-
covered the presence of the decedent, had no clear chance 
to avoid the accident. His action in applying his brake~ 
was reflex action rather than deliberation and clear 
thinking. 
There is some evidence that defendant may have 
been somewhat closer than 60 feet at the time of his first 
observation. If defendant was traveling at 30 miles per 
hour, during the normal reaction time of 3/4 seconds, 
he would have traveled 33 feet. Add this to 14 feet, the 
longest front skid mark, and we have 47 feet as the 
approximate distance from impact at which defendant's 
vehicle was located when he was first able to observe 
the decedent. The defendant could not at this distance 
have stopped his vehicle in time to avoid the accident 
if the decedent continued his pace into the path of 
defendant's vehicle. 
Plaintiff has set out in his brief the six propositions 
that must be met by the evidence in order for the jury 
to apply the doctrine of last clear chance. We do not 
argue with the propositions set forth in the instruction 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
pertaining to the doctrine as applied to a negligently 
inattentive plaintiff but do claim that the facts did not 
exist which would justify the submission of the case to 
the jury under that doctrine. 
Our Supre1ne Court, in commenting upon the appli-
cation of the last clear chance doctrine in the case of 
Graham v. Johnson, supra., in the course of its opinion 
said: 
''In the clear chance doctrine the plaintiff's 
negligence has become in a sense fixed and realiz-
able and on to this state of things defendant 
approaches on to the negligent plaintiff with and 
in control of the danger. 
* * * 
"One should not be held liable for failing to 
avoid the ·effect of the other's negligence iln a 
situation where it is spec~tlative as to ~chether he 
was afforded a clear opportunity to avoid it. In 
a situatiJon where both parties are on the move 
the significance of the wor:d 'clear' is most import-
ant. Otherwvse we may put the onus of .avoiding 
the effect of one's neglvgenoe on a party not negli-
gent. That party's negligence only arises when 
it is definitely established that there was ample 
time and opportunity to avoid the accident which 
was not taken advantage of." (Emphasis added.) 
The facts in the Graham case were son1ewhat in 
dispute, but it was clear that the defendant in that case 
knew of the presence of the minor on the street as she 
approached and also knew that the 1ninor was unaware 
of her approach. It was als·o clear that the defendant 
had plenty of time and a clear opportunity to take action 
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to avoid the accident. Each of these items is lacking in 
the present case. The defendant testified that decedent 
had his head down at the time he· first saw him just north 
of the center line. However, defendant did not know 
whether the decedent had looked for defendant's car just 
before, or at any tilne before defendant saw him, or 
whether he would look again. Defendant didn't wait to 
find out. Instead he took immediate action to avoid the 
accident. He testified as follows: 
Q. "As you approached the place where the 
accident occurred, state what you observed. 
A. "vV ell, as I approached 19th East all of 
a sudden I saw this object almost in front of my 
car, and just as quickly as I saw hi1n I threw on 
1ny brakes." (Record 124, Line 15). 
And again Record 130, Line 30 : 
Q. "Now, did you make any attempt to 
sound your horn at that time~" 
A. "No, sir, I did not, there wasn't time." 
Again on cross examination of Mr. Cottrell, he testified 
that when he saw Bruce he did the natural reaction and 
hit his brakes. (Record 140, Line 5 and Record 141, Line 
12). Also, Mr. Cottrell thought the decedent would stop. 
(Record 140, Line 21). 
Referring again to Graham v. Johnson, at Page 368, 
we quote from the court's opinion: 
"Where the situation is, to reasonable minds, 
so doubtful as to whether the second party had 
time to avoid it, the matter should not be given 
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to the jury; otheTwise, we are, as said in the case 
of Thomas v. Sadleir, 108 Utah 552, 162 Pac. 
( 2d) 112, 115, in grave danger of peTmitting the 
one really at " ... fault to shift the blame for the 
accident on the other by accentuation of the 
other's duty to avoid the effect of the first one's 
negligence.'' 
And the court further goes on to state that the oppor-
tunity to avoid the accident must not be a mere pos-
sibility but a clear opportunity. And it must appear 
t·o the court that the situation was such when the rela-
tive positions of the parties were changing with fair 
rapidity that the element of doubt as to whether one of 
them had an opportunity to avoid the accident and there-
fore a duty to do so must not be great. The peril in the 
present case when the defendant discovered the decedent 
was too imminent for an application of the last clear 
chance doctrine. As a 1natter of fact the decedent could 
at any time up to the actual instant of impact have 
avoided the accident by stopping suddenly, and he in 
fact had the better opportunity to avoid the accident. 
The plaintiff relies upon the case of M orby v. 
Rogers, 122 Utah 540, 252 Pac. (2d) 231. However, the 
facts in that case were entirely different than those in 
the present case. The· defendant had first observed the 
boy on a bicycle traveling in the same direction as the 
car when the defendant was 300 feet avray. At a dis-
tance of 200 feet the defendant sounded his horn. The 
boy on the bicycle at no time gave any indication that 
he heard the horn. The defendant continued on until 
within 78 feet of the boy, but actually took no safety 
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measures until within 20 feet of the boy, notwithstanding 
the fact that at the speed at which he was traveling he 
could have stopped within 43 feet, or 35 feet short of 
striking the boy. The boy in that case for a distance of 
300 feet was entirely in the lane of travel in which the 
automobile was proceeding. The decedent in our case 
was not in the lane of travel of the automobile until just 
an instant before the impact occurred. Using the· normal 
stopping distance, including reaction and braking time 
at 30 miles per hour, by no stretch of the imagination 
can it be argued that the defendant in the instant case 
had any such distance or time as was present in the 
Morby case within which to react after the decedent 
moved into the path of the defendant's car. 
The case of Compton v. Ogden Ry. & Depot Co., 
120 Utah 453, 235 Pac. (2d) 515, was one in which the 
principle which we believe applicable to our case was 
announced by the court. In that case the plaintiff was 
walking along the side of a railroad track as a train 
approached. The court in that case in speaking of the 
last clear chance doctrine, stated that it only applied: 
"* * * only if the plaintiff's negligence has 
0ome to rest .and plaintiff is thereafter unable 
by the exercise of reasonable vigilance and care 
to avoid the injury herself. The deceased in this 
case was not under those circumstances of in-
extricable peril. The fact is that at any rmstant 
up to the ttme she was actually struck, she could 
by the exercise of ordimary reasonable care, have 
apprehended the presence of the train, and by 
taktng one step to the side, have avoided her in-
jury.'' (Emphasis added). 
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Exactly the same situation is presented in the instant 
case. Until the time that the decedent crossed in front of 
the path of the defendant's vehicle, he could, by the 
exercise of ordinary care, have observed the presence of 
the automobile and yielded the right of vvay to it and 
thereby completely avoided the aC'cident. The court in 
the Compton case 1nade this further significant state-
ment: 
"We have never held that a mere conti~ntmwe 
of the same ~nattentive negligence created a situ-
ation of ~nextricable peril. When the injured per-
son's negligence has not come to rest, as it had 
in the above cases, so that by the exercise of 
reasonable care she would have been able to avoid 
the peril at any time up to the moment of injury, 
the injury is then the result of the concurring 
negligence of the plaintiff and the defendant. 
The one was just as much the proximate cause 
as the other. Ryan v. Union Pac. R. R. Co., 46 
Utah 530, 151 P. 71. Harper on Torts, Sec. 139, 
page 306, considers the situation of the negligent 
defendant and the negligent plaintiff where the 
defendant is unaware of plaintiff's peril and 
states: "* * * It follows, thus, that the doctnne of 
last cle:ar chance does not ~1telude cases ~n wh~ch 
a plaintiff has the physical and mental abiUty 
to avoid the risk up to the mom,ent of the harm. 
His 'continuing' negligence, as it is sometimes 
called, continues to insulate the defendant's negli-
gence, and the ordinary rule of contributory negli-
gence governs the case.' " (Emphasis added). 
The decedent's negligence in this cas.e ~continued 
right up to the point until he walked into the path of 
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the car, and at this tiine the defendant had no clear 
opportunity to avoid the accident. 
In the case of Fox v. Taylor, 10 Utah (2d) 174, 350 
Pac. ( 2d) 154, the court had occasion to consider the 
last clear chance doctrine in an accident involving an 
autOinohile and a pedestrian which was very similar 
to the f.aets in the caes before the court except that the 
pedestrian was not -crossing in a marked crosswalk. We 
quote from the court's opinion in that case: 
''The plaintiff insists, however, that the doc-
trine of last clear chance is applicable and the 
defendant should be held liable even if he did not 
see her, because in the exer•cise of due care he 
should have observed and avoided striking her. 
This contention involves consideration of the other 
frucet of the doctrine of last clear chance. Where 
the defendant does not actually know of the plain-
tiff's situation of peril, the doctrine can only 
properly be applied where the plaintiff has gotten 
into a position of inextricable peril. An illustra-
tion of this is where a person has caught his foot 
in a r.ailroad switch, or is in some other similar 
predicament, so that he is thereafter unable to 
avert the injury. In such a situation, the plain-
tiff's negligence has come to · rest. In such cir-
cumstances the defendant may be held responsible 
if he either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should know, of the plaintiff's helpless situa-
tion in time to avoid the injury and fails to do so. 
In regard to the application of this principle, 
the plaintiff here is faced with a dilemma: she 
w.as either in inextricable peril or she was not. 
If she was not in inextricable peril, then at any 
instant up to the time she got into such predica-
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ment, by the exercise of reasonable care, she could 
have observed the oncoming car and have avoided 
being hit. On the other hand, she could only have 
gotten into inextricable peril by getting into the 
path of the defendant r s car, and her peril could 
be considered inextricable only if the defendant 
was then too close to avoid striking her. Thus, 
by the very description of the situation, he did 
not have the "last clear chance'' to .avoid the 
injury. As the phrase indicates, it must be a fair 
and clear opportunity and not a mere possibility 
that the collision could have been .avoided. It is 
our conclusion that the trial court was correct 
in refusing to submit the case upon the doctrine 
of last clear chance.'' 
It is apparent from a review of the foregoing Utah 
cases that the doctrine of last clear chance is never 
applicable until a plaintiff arrives at a point as to be 
in peril. In this case the point was reached when the 
decedent started to cross in front of the path of defend-
ant's vehicle. It is also clear that the doctrine of last 
clear chance should never he applied to the ordinary 
case in which the accident creating the peril occurs 
practically simultaneously with the happening of the 
accident and in which neither party can be said to have 
had a last clear chance thereafter to avoid the conse-
quence. If the defendant with a vehicle traveling 30 
n1iles per hour had ,a last clear chance to avoid the 
accident, then certainly it could be said with more force 
and effect that the decedent had the last clear chance 
to avoid the accident because all he needed to do w.as to 
1nake an observation before he entered into the east-
bound lane of traffic to observe the defendant's vehicle, 
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at which ti1ne decedent could easily have stopped, where-
as it takes son1e distance within which to stop a moving 
vehicle. \V e, therefore, submit that the last clear chance 
doctrine •cannot apply in any case where the defendant's 
view is obstructed by darkness, glare, or other condition 
which prevents him from seeing the plaintiff until he 
enters the path of defendant's vehicle and particularly 
in the case now before this court. 
In 4Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & 
Practvce, Part 2, Sec. 2803, page 393 and 394, it is stated: 
'' * * * While a pedestrian may be in .a zone 
of danger as soon as he steps fron1 the sidewalk 
to the street where vehicles are passing, he is not 
then necessarily in danger from any particular 
.automobile. Until he reaches a point where he is 
in a position of peril from the automobile of the 
defendant and further progress on his part or 
other negligent conduct will not increase his dan-
ger, his negligence in proceeding forward can 
only be regarded as a contributing proximate 
cause of the injury.'' 
'Vhen defendant saw decedent some 6 ft. or more 
from the point of impact defendant immediately applied 
his brakes or sent the impulse to his foot to do so. It 
was after that reaction on the part of the defendant that 
decedent actually moved into the path of defendant's 
vehicle. It was only after defendant had acted that dece-
dent moved into a position of peril. The last clear chance 
doctrine was therefore inapplicable. 
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CONCLUSION 
The case was properly submitted to the jury on ap-
propriate instructions. The Court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury that defendant was guilty of negli-
gence as a matter of law as requested in plaintiff's In-
struction No. 2 and also properly refused to instruct 
the jury on the doctrine of last clear chance as requested 
by plaintiff in his Instruction No. 13. 
We submit that plaintiff has had a fair trial under 
appropriate instructions, that the trial Court did not 
commit error in denying plaintiff's motion for a new 
trial, and that the jury verdict and judgment entered 
below should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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